Room: Phillips 231
Time: Tue 08:30 AM-10:00 AM
Chair: Genevieve Kanter
Session Description
Considerable effort has been spent devising incentives to remedy the shortage of organs in the absence of a formal price driven market. Yet, the shortages in blood and organ donations persist. As of November 2009, the United Network for Organ Sharing reports 104,669 individuals are awaiting organs transplants. There are currently blood shortages in Canada, Germany, India, Malaysia, Nepal, and the United States. The proposed solutions from economics have been summarized in a special issue of the Journal of Economic Perspectives (Summer 2007). Although, a majority of economist support a pricing system for organs/blood donations there exist several challenges to the adoption of the market mechanism. First, the idea of trading organs for monetary rewards is considered repugnant, may abuse the poor, and may lead to poor quality. Second, the lack of price variation in the organs market has lead to little empirical analysis. Instead, empirical studies have focuses on alternative influences and incentives still present in the organ/blood market. In this session, three empirical papers on organ/blood donations examine the following questions:
1) How do changes in motorcycle helmet laws affect the supply of organ donations?
2) How do changes in the supply of cadaveric donors affect the supply of living donors?
3) How do economic incentives affect the rate of blood donations?
These papers highlight the present condition of the organs market and provide insight into a price driven organs market. The first two papers consider potential demand and supply shifters in this market. The third paper provides insight on a price driven market for organs through the analysis of monetary payment for blood donations.
Session Organizer: Jose Fernandez (University of Louisville)
The 3rd Biennial Conference of the American Society of Health Economists took place at Cornell University.
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