Room: Phillips 403
Time: Mon 08:30 AM-10:00 AM
Chair: Frank Sloan (Duke University)
Session Description
Beneficiaries in Medicare, the federal health insurance program for the elderly and disabled, choose between two major options: traditional Medicare (TM) and a set of private health insurance plans, including managed care plans, offered under Medicare Part C. Part C has suffered severe criticism since its inception more than twenty five years ago, and remains very controversial. Nonetheless, Part C, currently known as Medicare Advantage (MA), is the main hope for modernizing Medicare through introduction of the cost and quality management techniques common in private health insurance.
To date, MA has arguably failed to achieve its objective of providing high-quality care with greater efficiency than traditional Medicare (TM). The June 2007 Report to Congress of the Medicare Payment Advisory Commission (MedPAC) concluded: “The current MA payment policy is inconsistent with MedPAC’s principles of payment equity between MA and the traditional FFS program.” Furthermore, current dissatisfaction with the fiscal performance of MA has led policy makers to propose cutting payment levels to MA plans. A well-designed MA program has the power to move Medicare into a position of leadership in health plan payment policy, while a poorly-designed program will stifle attempts at positive reform.
This session consists of papers initiating research on the economic underpinnings of Medicare Advantage.
Session Organizer: Joseph Newhouse (Harvard Medical School)
The 3rd Biennial Conference of the American Society of Health Economists took place at Cornell University.
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